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LONG ARM STATUTE JURISDICTION WHEN THE
TORTIOUS ACT OCCURS IN ONE STATIE,
THE INJURIOUS CONSEQUENCES
IN ANOTHER
The states have greatly expanded their jurisdiction over non-
residents by the enactment of long-arm statutes. The extent to which
jurisdiction can be acquired over a nonresident is subject only to
satisfying the requirements of federal due process. This test is gen-
erally thought to consist of three steps: (1) Some minimum contact
must exist between the state and the nonresident. (2) The cause of
action must arise out of that contact. (3) Assuming the first two
requirements are met, due process must be satisfied if the nonresi-
dent is forced to defend in the forum state.1 When the nonresident
or his agent has conducted activities within the state, jurisdiction
is generally extended to include him. But jurisdiction becomes
more difficult to extend to a nonresident when he commits an act
outside the forum state which causes injury to person or property
within the state, this act being his only contact.
I. THE SUPREME COURT GUIDELINES
The Supreme Court in 1958 asserted in Hanson v. Denckla2 that
there are limitations to the expansion of state jurisdiction over
nonresidents. This note will explore the limitations referred to in
Hanson in the context in which the lower courts have applied them
to the difficult cases.
The modem test of the constitutional limitations on state
court jurisdiction over nonresident is contained in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington.3 The test permits the assertion of juris-
diction over non-residents when the nonresident has certain min-
imal contacts with the forum state, but the contacts must be sub-
stantial enough to satisfy due process. A court must decide whether
it is fair and reasonable to require the nonresident to defend an
action in the forum state.4 The due process requirements are met
when the assertion of jurisdiction would not offend "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."5
1 This summarization of the due process requirements was adopted from Note,
47 GEo. L.J. 342, 351-52 (1958).
2 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
3 326 U.S. 810 (1945).
4 Id. at 320.
5 Id. at 316.
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In McGee v. International Life Ins.,8 the Supreme Court of the
United States made it clear that one transaction in the forum state
may be enough to satisfy due process. A Texas insurance company
had assumed the obligations of an Arizona corporation, and mailed
a re-insurance offer to a California plaintiff. The plaintiff accepted
the offer by mail from California and mailed premium payments to
Texas. There was no evidence the nonresident defendant had ever
transacted other business in California. The Court upheld juris-
diction because the suit "was based on a contract which had sub-
stantial connection with that state."7 The Court noted that Califor-
nia had an interest in providing effective redress for its residents
when nonresident insurers refused to pay claims solicited in that
state.8 The reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction depended upon
factors establishing the interest of the forum state in the subject
matter of the lawsuit, as opposed to successive business activity. In
appraising the interest of the forum state, Justice Black noted that
in the trial of insurance cases the essential evidence is to be found
in the state of the insured's residence.9 After balancing the interests
of the forum state and the plaintiff against the inconvenience of
defending in a foreign forum, jurisdiction was upheld.10
One year later, the Supreme Court refused to uphold jurisdiction
in Hanson v. Denckla.11 Florida attempted to gain jurisdiction over a
Delaware trustee, the trust corpus being located in Delaware. The
trust was created by a Delaware resident, who later became domi-
ciled in Florida. The Delaware trustee corresponded with her by
mail, and income payments were mailed to her in Florida. The
Court held Florida had no jurisdiction over the trustee because "it
is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defend-
ant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activi-
ties within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and pro-
tection of its laws."12 But the trustee had done nothing more than
to continue a pre-existing relationship with the settlor after her
6 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
7 Id. at 223.
8 Id. This decision may have been influenced by the fact that California had
enacted a statute which specifically subjected foreign corporations to jurisdiction on
insurance contracts, thus dearly evidencing the state's desire to protect its citizens in
insurance transactions.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 224.
11 357 US. 235 (1958).
12 Id. at 253.
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change of domicile. The Hanson Court denied jurisdiction dis-
tinguishing McGee on two grounds. First, in McGee the nonresi-
dent insurance company went into California by mail and solicited
business.13 The Hanson trustee had performed no act in Florida
that could be considered exercising a Florida privilege. Second,
the Court stated:
The cause of action in this case is not one that arises out of an
act done or transaction consummated in the forum state. In
that respect, it differs from McGee .... 14
There are at least two plausible readings of the Hanson opin-
ion. One results from a literal reading of the minimum contact due
process requirement. This interpretation would mean that in each
case, to obtain jurisdiction over the nonresident, a court would
have to find some act by which the defendant purposefully availed
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum. The
alternative reading would be to confine Hanson to its facts. The pur-
posefully availing test would be used only in a case in which the
nonresident's contact with the state is his transaction of business.
Many states have included in their long arm statute the com-
mission of a tortious act as a basis of jurisdiction.'5 These provi-
sions have been construed as extending jurisdiction to the non-
resident who commits an act outside the state which results in con-
sequences within the state.'" Therefore, under the International
Shoe test, a court must decide whether it is fair and reasonable to
require the nonresident to defend an action based on the injuri-
ous effect of the outside act.17 When one commits a tortious act
he obviously does not consider the benefit of the laws of the state
in which such act is committed. Thus, a rule limiting jurisdiction
13 Id. at 251.
14 Id.
15 E.g., OH-o REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.382 (Page Supp. 1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1967); ORE. REv. STAT., § 14.035 (1965); See also Comment, Ohio's
Long Arm Statute, 15 Cr.Lv.-MAR. L. Rnv. 363 (1966); Comment, Jurisdiction Under
New Ohio "Long Arm" Statute-Problems of Interpretation and Application, 35 U.
Cm. L. REv. 157 (1966); Note, Conflict of Laws-Jurisdiction-Long-Arm Statute-Commis-
sion of a Tort, 44 ORE. L. REv. 131 (1965).
16 See United Medical Laboratories v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 256
F. Supp. 570 (D. Ore. 1966); Gray v. American Radiator, 22 1U.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761
(1961).
'7 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and
nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the
laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.
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to defendants who purposefully conduct activities within the forum
state is very difficult to apply in the tort situation. The contact
with the forum state is the injurious effect of the act committed
outside the state. Hanson denied jurisdiction because (1) the
cause of action did not arise out of the nonresident's connection
with the forum state, and (2) the nonresident did nothing by which
he purposefully availed himself of that state's laws.' If the cause of
action arises out of a contact that amounts to the commission of
a tortious act within the state, and not out of the transaction of
business within the state, can a court still uphold jurisdiction over
the nonresident without first finding that he purposefully availed
himself of the benefits of the forum state's laws?
II. LOWER COURT APPLICATIONS OF THE Hanson DocnUNES
The lower courts have employed several different approaches
in attempting to reconcile their upholding of jurisdiction with the
Hanson decision. There has been little difficulty in upholding juris-
diction over a nonresident when he or his agent commits an act
within the state. The difficulty occurs when the defendant's acts are
committed outside the forum jurisdiction and cause injury to per-
sons or property within the forum.
The Supreme Court of Illinois, in Gray v. American Radi-
ator,19 upheld jurisdiction over an Ohio corporation under the
tortious act provision of the Illinois long arm statute.20 The non-
resident's only contact with Illinois was the presence of its pro-
duct there. Titan Valve manufactured in Ohio a safety valve which
it sold to American Radiator, a Pennsylvania corporation. This cor-
poration used the valve in manufacturing water heaters, one of
which was sold to the Illinois plaintiff. Plaintiff was injured when
the water heater exploded in his Illinois residence. There was no
evidence the nonresident manufacturer of the safety valve, Titan,
did any business in Illinois, other than the fact that the valves were
used in water heaters which American Radiator sent into that state.
The Illinois Supreme Court, in straining to comply with the lan-
guage of Hanson, held that one could reasonably infer that the
nonresident defendant foresaw that the valves were being manu-
factured for ultimate use in many states, one of which might well
have been Illinois.21 The Ohio manufacturer undoubtedly bene-
18 357 U.S. 235, 251, 253 (1958).
19 Gray v. American Radiator, 22 IUL 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
20 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1967).
21 Gray v. American Radiator, 22 IL 2d 432, 442, 176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (1961).
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fited from the protection of Illinois law in the marketing of water
heaters containing its valves.22 The court appeared to conclude
that foreseeability was the equivalent of purposefully availing the
benefit of state law.
Other more recent product liability cases have added author-
ity to the Gray doctrines. Ehlers v. U.S. Heating & Cooling Mfg.
Corp.23 involved essentially the same fact pattern. The Minnesota
Supreme Court reached the same conclusion through similar rea-
soning. The court decided that the appellant corporation, al-
though never sending its agents into the state, or shipping products
directly to the distributors there, nevertheless manufactured its pro-
duct for use by the general public. There was no proof that this
area of foreseeable use excluded Minnesota. Thus the nonresident
manufacturer was purposefully availing himself of the benefit of
Minnesota law. 24
The Supreme Court of Iowa also found the Hanson test to
have been met by the presence of only a single product of the non-
resident manufacturer. In Andersen v. National Presto Industries,
Inc.,25 the court asserted that it would be unrealistic to deny the
knowledge that commercial products of an interstate corporation
are designed for whatever markets may be found for them. The
court stated, "They are placed in the stream of commerce; and
when they reach a foreign state they have the protection of its
laws." 26
The preceding cases, all dealing with product liability in which
the nonresident's only contact with the forum state was the product
itself, had little difficulty in disposing of the Hanson requirements.
They considered the entry of the defendant's product, though
sent in by an independent third party, to have been the contact
with the forum state. These cases also held the cause of action arose
out of that contact. Each of the three courts predicated jurisdiction
under the commission of a tortious act provision of their long arm
statute. They did not hold that the nonresident was transacting
business within the state.27
22 Id.
23 267 Minn. 56, 124 N.W.2d 824 (1963).
24 Id. at 61, 124 N.W.2d at 827.
25 257 Iowa 911, 135 N.W.2d 639 (1965).
26 Id. at 919, 135 N.W.2d at 643.
27 For excellent analyses of the products liabilities cases, see Comment, Tortious
Act As a Basis For Jurisdiction in Product Liability Cases, 33 For. L. REv. 671 (1965);
Comment, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Manufacturers in Product
Liability Actions, 63 Mii. L. REv. 1028 (1965).
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Another court disposed of the Hanson language with a differ-
ent rationale. In Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass, Corp.,28 the
nonresident defendant's only contact with Arizona was the presence
of an allegedly defective glass dish. The dish was manufactured and
sold to plaintiff outside the state, and plantiff was injured by the
dish when it exploded in his Arizona residence. The court held it
not necessary under the Hanson language to find the defendant
manufacturer had purposefully availed itself of the forum state's
laws, 20 or that he had forseen the use of his product in Arizona.30
Referring to the purposeful activity language of Hanson, the court
said:
We do not think the quoted language can be construed lit-
erally ... A rule limiting jurisdiction to defendants who pur-
posefully conduct activities within the state cannot properly be
applied in product liability cases in view of the fortuitous route
by which products enter any particular state.31
But the court upheld jurisdiction because it felt the defendant
could have foreseen the product's ultimate use in Arizona, but not
because Hanson required this result. The court stated:
Upon reflection, we think it would be a rare situation where
a manufacturer could not foresee the presence of his product
anywhere within the continental United States. That possibil-
ity should motivate him to seek appropriate insurance.32
The Arizona Supreme Court placed emphasis on foreseeability in
this case, not because it was necessary to comply with the Hanson
doctrine, but because it felt it would be fair and reasonable to re-
quire the nonresident to defend the action. He could have foreseen
that his product would be used in Arizona, and therefore could
have protected himself.
A recent case outside the products liability area also relied
on foreseeability. Bibie v. T. D. Publishing Corp.33 involved an
alleged invasion of privacy. The United States District Court for
the Northern District of California upheld jurisdiction over a non-
resident publisher although its only contact with California was
that it sold magazines to an independent distributor who distributed
28 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966).
29 Id. at 256, 413 P.2d at 735.
30 Id. at 259, 413 P.2d at 737.
31 Id. at 256, 413 P.2d at 735.
82 Id. at 259, 413 P.2d at 737.
33 252 F. Supp. 185 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
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them in California. The court decided the defendant was well
aware a substantial number of its magazines were destined for sale
in California. Therefore, it was not unreasonable to conclude that
by its own affirmative act the defendant had chosen to exploit the
California market for the sale of its products.34
Hanson v. Denckla clearly established that there were some
limits to expanding in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents.35
However, the doctrines used in that case have not significantly im-
peded the lower courts from asserting jurisdiction over nonresi-
dents. In cases where the contact consisted of only a single product,
sent into the state by a third party, the courts have attempted to
comply with the Hanson language through the ultimate use and
the foreseeability theories. 36 The Phillips court found it unneces-
sary to reconcile its case with Hanson. That court decided that Han-
son did not apply to the fact situation before them. The contact
in the Phillips case was the tortious injury, not the transaction of
business which Hanson was considering.37 By limiting Hanson to
its facts, the Phillips court effectively extended the limits of due
process.
III. A POSSIBLE POINT OF JURISDICTIONAL LIMITATION
When will long arm jurisdiction violate due process? One could
conclude that a court following the Phillips rationale would only
deny jurisdiction when the nonresident could not reasonably fore-
see that his act would have an injurious effect in the forum state.
The other product liability cases, like Gray, continued to pay lip
service to the purposeful activity requirement of Hanson. But it
does not follow that one who foresees the use of his product in the
forum state necessarily invokes the benefit of that state's laws.
A recent case decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
may give some indication of jurisdictional limitation. Taylor v.
Portland Paramount Corp.38 denied a Portland, Oregon theater's
attempt to gain jurisdiction over Elizabeth Taylor. Twentieth Cen-
tury Fox and Taylor had produced the film "Cleopatra" which
34 Id. at 189.
35 357 U.S. 285, 251 (1958).
It is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all
restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts.
36 Most of the products liability cases have followed the language of Gray, supra
note 22, in an attempt to comply with the doctrines of Hanson.
37 Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 256, 413 P.2d 732, 785
(1966).
38 383 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1967).
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Taylor starred in. Fox contracted with appellee, Portland Para-
mount, to exhibit the film in Oregon. Taylor had no control over
the distribution of the film and had nothing to do with the negotia-
tions between Fox and Portland Paramount. But she was to re-
ceive in excess of 10,000 dollars from this exhibition contract as
her share of the gross receipts. Portland Paramount charged that
Taylor had committed a tortious act within Oregon in that she
had negligently conducted herself with Richard Burton in such
a manner as to arouse indignation and adverse opinion in the minds
of the Oregon theater-going populace, causing them to refuse to
view the movie. The courts' basis for denying jurisdiction was
summed up in the following statement:
If it be said that, through the mechanism of the distribution
agreement, she sent the picture "Cleopatra" into Oregon, a posi-
tion we accept only Arguendo, it is not that act which is the
basis of the tort cause of action. Rather, it is her conduct else-
where with Burton, and her disparagement of the picture, not
in Oregon, that are claimed to be the tort.39
The court asserted that Taylor had a minimum contact with Ore-
gon, the distribution mechanism, but that the cause of action arose
out of her conduct in Europe, rather than her contact with Oregon.
Apparently the court did not consider the possibility that because
the injurious effect of the act committed outside the state oc-
curred within the state, it could be argued that the "tortious act"
referred to in the long arm statute was committed in Oregon.
There are at least two troublesome points in the line the Tay-
lor court appears to have drawn. When there is a long arm statute
that contemplates jurisdiction by the commission of a tortious act
that causes injury within the state, is not the injury itself the min-
imum contact? For example, in the Taylor case, was not Taylor's
contact with Oregon the impact she caused in the minds of theater
goers? If the minimum contact was the tort, and not the distribu-
tion, the cause of action did arise out of the contact. Also, a factor
that may have affected the Taylor decision is the apparent frivolous
nature of the plaintiff's cause of action.40 Was a basic reason for
39 Id. at 642.
40 Id. at 642 n.8, 643. The court referred to the Gray case in which the Illinois
Supreme Court stated:
It must be remembered that lawsuits can be brought on frivolous demands
or groundless claims as well as on legitimate ones, and that procedural rules
must be designed and appraised in the light of what is fair and just to both
sides in the dispute.
Gray v. American Radiator, 22 Ill. 2d 432, 441, 176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (1961).
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the court's reluctance to extend jurisdiction a feeling that it would
be unfair to require Taylor to defend in Oregon on such a tenu-
ous cause of action?
With regard to the first of the preceding points, the Washing-
ton Supreme Court has not had the difficulty the Ninth Circuit indi-
cated. The case of Golden Gate Hop Ranch v. Velsicol Chemical
Corp. 41 was very similar to the Taylor case with respect to the na-
ture of the minimum contact. The plaintiff claimed an agent of
the defendant wrote a letter from Chicago to plaintiff's business in
Washington, advising him to use a certain chemical on his hops.
The chemical caused damage to the crop. The alleged tortious act
was the agent's negligence in preparing and sending such advice.
The injury occurred in Washington, as a result of the letter com-
ing from Chicago. The court held:
[W]here damages result from negligence of a defendant, the
injury occurring in this state is an inseparable part of the
"tortious act" as that term is used in the statute . . . .(The
statute referred to being the long arm statute).42
How different factually is this case from the Taylor situation?
Here, the act occurred in Chicago. A letter crossed the state line, re-
sulting in injury within the forum state. In Taylor, the court de-
clared that it was Taylor's conduct with Burton in Europe that was
the tortious act. Yet the alleged injury was the alienation in the
minds of potential theater goers in Oregon. Would it not be too
fine a distinction to place the emphasis upon the medium by which
the injurious consequences are carried into the state? Perhaps the
frivolity of the plaintiff's claim in Taylor swayed the court more
than the opinion indicated.
Since at the time of the Taylor case there was judicial prece-
dent holding that the tortious act is committed in the state where
the injury occurs, regardless of the state where the act was com-
mitted, several possibilities with respect to the Taylor opinion are
raised. Perhaps the Ninth Circuit did not wish to apply the theory
enunciated by the Washington Supreme Court, in the absence of
any tangible article such as a letter, or a consumer product, com-
ing into the state. Perhaps the nature of plaintiff's claim was so
frivolous that the court thought some theory was necessary to dis-
allow jurisdiction, and chose to ignore the possibility that the injury
was the minimum contact. Perhaps the Ninth Circuit was not aware
41 66 Wash. 2d 469, 403 P.2d 351 (1965).
42 Id. at 471, 403 P.2d at 352.
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of the Washington holdings, and thus their decision reflected no
indication of their opinion of this theory. But their express refer-
ence to the fact that the tort was committed in Europe would seem
to indicate they did not adhere to the injury-contact theory of
the Washington decisions.
Thus, the question remains. At what point will jurisdictional
limitation of the reach of the long arm statute occur? The deci-
sions are so numerous as to apparently settle this issue when a
defendant manufacturer's product comes into a state by the pro-
cess of commercial distribution and causes injury. Even though the
defendant transacts no business in that state, he probably will be
required to defend there. The majority of these cases seem to agree
that the manufacturer could "foresee" the use of the product in the
forum state, and thus availed himself of the benefit of that state's
law. They consider the entry of the defendant's product, though
sent in by an independent third party, to be the contact with the
forum state. Even the decisions involving libel as the injury have
contained the foreseeability element. Generally, the courts have held
that the defendant publisher could foresee the sale and use of his
printed material in the forum state. Another theory is that formu-
lated by the Washington Supreme Court. Where damages result in
the forum state, the injury occurring there is an inseparable part
of the "tortious act" as that term is used in the statute.
It would seem we are left with little limitation to the state's
power to require a non-resident to defend an action in that state.
The Taylor opinion is one of few checks on the rapid expansion of
state jurisdiction. The nature of plaintiff's claim in that case may
explain its uniqueness. But the specific answers to the question have
not been forthcoming.
IV. CONCLUSION
The lower court cases have shown that the restrictive language
of Hanson is not necessarily a significant barrier to expanding in
personam jurisdiction. They have either manipulated the Hanson
test to suit their own factual situations, or limited it to the facts of
Hanson. The better approach would be to consider the purposeful
activity language of Hanson to be only one factor in the balancing of
interests process. The courts should take into account various factors
such as the extent the nonresident has received the benefit of state
law, the quantity of the contacts, the nature and quality of the con-
tacts, the source and connection of the cause of action to those
contacts, the interest of the forum state, the relative availability of
1969]
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evidence, the burden of defense or prosecution in one place rather
than another, and the accessibility to an alternative forum. To the
extent the courts now implement this balancing process, their
opinions should more clearly reflect the decisive factors. Only
through elucidating what they feel are the vital elements necessary
to uphold or deny jurisdiction will the courts be able to reasonably
define the limits of this unwieldy due process requirement. The
Supreme Court seems to be willing to leave the problem to the
lower courts. These courts, given this opportunity, should be more
definitive.
Michael G. Long
